The Case For Micro-Management

Some on the Republican side have decried the supplemental appropriations bill just passed by the House for its 'micro-management' of the Iraq war effort. The bill sets up a timeline for withdrawal of our troops over a period of time, based on a series of milestones like those the President himself described when presenting his 'surge' initiative.

Many have pointed out that the Congress has an established role in determining funding policy, even in war time. I have also pointed out that five years should be long enough to conclude a war that was supposed to last six weeks, probably not six months. The President should be embarrassed to say that now, after four years, that we’re ‘beginning to see some signs of progress.’ So, in context, what the House has passed hardly seems intrusive.

A new report(pdf) from the GAO makes me think that micro-management is, however, exactly what is called for. Remember, back before Iraqi place names became familiar, hearing about a place called al Qaa Qaa? There was a weapons depot there?

In our report, we concluded that a fundamental gap existed between the OIF war plan assumptions and the experiences of U.S. and coalition forces in Iraq, contributing to insufficient troops being on the ground to prevent widespread looting of conventional munitions storage sites and resulting in looted munitions being a continuing asymmetric threat to U.S. and coalition forces. The human, strategic, and financial costs of this failure to provide sufficient troops have been high, with IEDs made with looted munitions causing about half of all U.S. combat fatalities and casualties in Iraq and killing hundreds of Iraqis and contributing to increasing instability, challenging U.S. strategic goals in Iraq. Further, DOD does not appear to have conducted a theaterwide survey and assessed the risk associated with unsecured conventional munitions storage sites to U.S. forces and others. Such a survey and assessment combined with associated risk mitigation strategies—such as providing more troops or other security measures—could assist DOD in conserving lives and in meeting its strategic goal to leave a stable nation behind when U.S. forces ultimately leave Iraq. We recommended that the Joint Chief of Staff conduct a theaterwide survey and risk assessment regarding unsecured conventional munitions in Iraq and report ensuing risk mitigation strategies and the results of those strategies to Congress. (emphasis mine)

Before the invasion, the civilian and military leaders in charge had completely unrealistic assumptions about what would be needed. The munitions they left unguarded have resulted in a huge number of deaths, perhaps as many as half our fatalities and casualties. That would be bad enough. But they haven't even bothered to figure out how much is still out there, and what the risk is, even now, years later.

Though somehow we have had time for a showy press conference telling us about the risk from Iranian weapons.

At some point you have to wonder, if we don't get Congress involved in managing this effort, will we have any actual management of this war at all?