Documentation

I can't believe there is anyone reading this blog who doesn't already think the war in Iraq has been completely bungled, but in the interest of providing useful documentation, I thought I should point to this 3-part series from the Knight-Ridder newspapers. From Part 1, "Post-war planning non-existent":

WASHINGTON - In March 2003, days before the start of the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, American war planners and intelligence officials met at Shaw Air Force Base in South Carolina to review the Bush administration's plans to oust Saddam Hussein and implant democracy in Iraq.

Near the end of his presentation, an Army lieutenant colonel who was giving a briefing showed a slide describing the Pentagon's plans for rebuilding Iraq after the war, known in the planners' parlance as Phase 4-C. He was uncomfortable with his material - and for good reason.

The slide said: "To Be Provided."

A Knight Ridder review of the administration's Iraq policy and decisions has found that it invaded Iraq without a comprehensive plan in place to secure and rebuild the country. The administration also failed to provide some 100,000 additional U.S. troops that American military commanders originally wanted to help restore order and reconstruct a country shattered by war, a brutal dictatorship and economic sanctions.

From Part 2:"Iraq reconstruction efforts overcome by ongoing violence":

"Every time we had a chance to do something right, we did it wrong," lamented a veteran State Department official directly involved in Iraq policy.

A comprehensive Knight Ridder review of the 14-month U.S.-led occupation and interviews with more than three dozen current and former U.S. officials and military commanders identified some of the major mistakes:

_ Disbanding the Iraqi army.

_ Purging tens of thousands of former Baath Party members from the government, many of whom had joined the party only to feed their families, instead of rooting out only Saddam's most loyal henchmen.

_ Failing to restore public services and underestimating the mammoth task of rebuilding Iraq's shattered economy.

_ Waiting too long to recognize the gravity of the insurgency, then reacting at times with excessive force that caused numerous civilian casualties, broke cultural taboos and turned Iraqis against the U.S.-led occupation.

Iraq's interim president, Ghazi al Yawer, summed up the feelings of many Iraqis when he said: "We blame the United States 100 percent for the security in Iraq. They occupied the country, disbanded the security agencies and for 10 months left Iraq's borders open for anyone to come in without a visa or even a passport."

From Part 3 "Iraq's future path uncertain because of insurgency":

After nearly 19 months of combat, more than 1,000 American soldiers dead and $119 billion spent, the central question about Iraq isn't whether it will become a beacon of democracy in the Middle East but whether the United States can prevent it from becoming a black hole of instability.

The answer may depend on whether Americans are willing to stomach what many military analysts believe will be a guerrilla war for years to come.

That's true no matter who wins the presidency in November, and whether or not an Iraqi election takes place in January, a cross section of foreign policy experts said.

It's really hard for normal, reasonably intelligent, competent individuals to imagine just how bad it is. Each new article seems to expose entire new dimensions of ineptitude.