The Alternative
One of the advantages of using a timetable, like the one in the Democratic spending plan for Iraq, is that it establishes an agreement about objectives and frames a plan.
This may be one of the most radical elements of the Democrats approach: it asserts that our effort in Iraq could and ought to be managed using a documented plan. This plan would have pre-agreement about just which metrics mattered to know if the plan was moving forward or not. Competent managers know that future events can force timetables to be revised, even extended, but they understand the value in having one. It serves as a reminder of the original goals, and formalizes the process of changing direction, since it becomes a clear diversion from the timetable.
One of the problems with the administration's approach to Iraq since before the invasion has been an almost fanatical aversion to this concept of planning. The current rhetorical debate over the spending bill in Congress highlights this. The President isn't arguing that the timetable in the bill is wrong, or offering an alternative one. That would legitimize the idea of a timetable, a plan with accountability. Rather, Mr. Bush demands money with complete freedom. He doesn't want to have a plan, and he doesn't want to be held to actually accomplish anything previously committed to.
The alternative offered is a vague, shifting morass, in which short-term objectives are identified and trumpeted loudly, accompanied by rhetorical air-cover in Washington. These objectives are often short-sighted, or impractical, but since they exist in a environment of deliberate vagueness, they can be dropped without admitting failure, merely by announcing a new, similarly ill-defined initiative. This also resets the interminable "about six months" clock for the President's rhetorical wingmen, who will say, yet again, that we're 'turning a corner' and we need to give the new initiative time to succeed.
The handling of the latest of these initiatives, the "surge", reveals the approach. When announcing the 'change in strategy', the President supported his decision with mention of specific benchmarks. Yet, when the Democrats put these very benchmarks into their bill, and attached funding consequences to their achievement, Mr. Bush responded with tantrums and name-calling. Similarly, in that January speech, Bush remained committed to the idea of 'as the Iraqis stand up, we'll stand down.' He called for acceleration in the training of Iraqi troops, saying it "remains the essential U.S. security mission in Iraq."
Just don't hold him to that.
Once again, the administration is reacting to events. It seems clear that General Petraeus has to deal with an increasing sectarian divide and with violence that makes the idea of unified, professional Iraqi military and police forces even more impractical than it has been for some time. It must seem to him that solving the problem of security, using the US forces he can trust, is the prerequisite to solving the training problem. First things first.
But has there been serious consideration of what that 'first thing' will take? Has there been commitment from the Congress and the people to that objective? "Defeating the insurgents and taking control of troubled provinces" sounds like a completely different war than training Iraqis so we can come home. In fact, it sounds like a completely different war than the "we'll boost our efforts in Baghdad so that the Iraqis have a few months to pull themselves together before we leave" idea that was behind the 'surge' rhetoric.
Luckily for Bush, he's not responsible for meeting any timetables, so he has the freedom to decide that we're committing to an open-ended counter-insurgency effort in the midst of a multi-party civil war, and not have to explain it to anyone. He can decide to shelve his "essential security mission", and substitute a new one, without anyone asking about it. He can talk about things that suggest to the people that we are on the verge of heading for home, after a short 'surge', when in fact we're preparing for a longer, bloodier stay.
I feel confidant that there are no plans for how we can sustain such an effort, what will keep us from being further bogged down in escalating guerilla warfare, and how to decide which of the many sides in that country count as 'the insurgency' at any given time. I'm not the only one who thinks that way. General Jack Sheehan was approached about being "war czar."
This may be one of the most radical elements of the Democrats approach: it asserts that our effort in Iraq could and ought to be managed using a documented plan. This plan would have pre-agreement about just which metrics mattered to know if the plan was moving forward or not. Competent managers know that future events can force timetables to be revised, even extended, but they understand the value in having one. It serves as a reminder of the original goals, and formalizes the process of changing direction, since it becomes a clear diversion from the timetable.
One of the problems with the administration's approach to Iraq since before the invasion has been an almost fanatical aversion to this concept of planning. The current rhetorical debate over the spending bill in Congress highlights this. The President isn't arguing that the timetable in the bill is wrong, or offering an alternative one. That would legitimize the idea of a timetable, a plan with accountability. Rather, Mr. Bush demands money with complete freedom. He doesn't want to have a plan, and he doesn't want to be held to actually accomplish anything previously committed to.
The alternative offered is a vague, shifting morass, in which short-term objectives are identified and trumpeted loudly, accompanied by rhetorical air-cover in Washington. These objectives are often short-sighted, or impractical, but since they exist in a environment of deliberate vagueness, they can be dropped without admitting failure, merely by announcing a new, similarly ill-defined initiative. This also resets the interminable "about six months" clock for the President's rhetorical wingmen, who will say, yet again, that we're 'turning a corner' and we need to give the new initiative time to succeed.
The handling of the latest of these initiatives, the "surge", reveals the approach. When announcing the 'change in strategy', the President supported his decision with mention of specific benchmarks. Yet, when the Democrats put these very benchmarks into their bill, and attached funding consequences to their achievement, Mr. Bush responded with tantrums and name-calling. Similarly, in that January speech, Bush remained committed to the idea of 'as the Iraqis stand up, we'll stand down.' He called for acceleration in the training of Iraqi troops, saying it "remains the essential U.S. security mission in Iraq."
Just don't hold him to that.
WASHINGTON - Military planners have abandoned the idea that standing up Iraqi troops will enable American soldiers to start coming home soon and now believe that U.S. troops will have to defeat the insurgents and secure control of troubled provinces.See, you can't quietly abandon things like "as the Iraqis stand up, we'll stand down" if there's a timetable for getting those Iraqis standing up, and getting our troops stood down.
Training Iraqi troops, which had been the cornerstone of the Bush administration's Iraq policy since 2005, has dropped in priority, officials in Baghdad and Washington said.
No change has been announced, and a Pentagon spokesman, Col. Gary Keck, said training Iraqis remains important. "We are just adding another leg to our mission," Keck said, referring to the greater U.S. role in establishing security that new troops arriving in Iraq will undertake.
But evidence has been building for months that training Iraqi troops is no longer the focus of U.S. policy. Pentagon officials said they know of no new training resources that have been included in U.S. plans to dispatch 28,000 additional troops to Iraq. The officials spoke only on the condition of anonymity because they aren't authorized to discuss the policy shift publicly. Defense Secretary Robert Gates made no public mention of training Iraqi troops on Thursday during a visit to Iraq.
Once again, the administration is reacting to events. It seems clear that General Petraeus has to deal with an increasing sectarian divide and with violence that makes the idea of unified, professional Iraqi military and police forces even more impractical than it has been for some time. It must seem to him that solving the problem of security, using the US forces he can trust, is the prerequisite to solving the training problem. First things first.
But has there been serious consideration of what that 'first thing' will take? Has there been commitment from the Congress and the people to that objective? "Defeating the insurgents and taking control of troubled provinces" sounds like a completely different war than training Iraqis so we can come home. In fact, it sounds like a completely different war than the "we'll boost our efforts in Baghdad so that the Iraqis have a few months to pull themselves together before we leave" idea that was behind the 'surge' rhetoric.
Luckily for Bush, he's not responsible for meeting any timetables, so he has the freedom to decide that we're committing to an open-ended counter-insurgency effort in the midst of a multi-party civil war, and not have to explain it to anyone. He can decide to shelve his "essential security mission", and substitute a new one, without anyone asking about it. He can talk about things that suggest to the people that we are on the verge of heading for home, after a short 'surge', when in fact we're preparing for a longer, bloodier stay.
I feel confidant that there are no plans for how we can sustain such an effort, what will keep us from being further bogged down in escalating guerilla warfare, and how to decide which of the many sides in that country count as 'the insurgency' at any given time. I'm not the only one who thinks that way. General Jack Sheehan was approached about being "war czar."
"The very fundamental issue is, they don't know where the hell they're going," said retired Marine Gen. John J. "Jack" Sheehan, a former top NATO commander who was among those rejecting the job.The entire history of our involvement in Iraq has been one of them "making it up as they go along". Mr. Bush wants to keep it that way.
posted by Paul at 6:59 AM |
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